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DICTA
profession and the collection of data and evidence for the use
of grievance committees in disbarment proceedings."
Mr. Roberts, secretary of the Conference, has ventured
the prophecy that whereas in 1934 there were over two hun-
dred members of the Junior Bar Conference, by 1944 "more
than ten thousand men and women lawyers under thirty-
six years of age will be the backbone of the American Bar
Association and of civic liberty in the United States."
DID YOU KNOW
By GERALD E. WELSH, Associate Editor of Dicta
HAT in Colorado motions for directed verdicts by allTparties at the close of the evidence in a jury trial con-
stitute a submission of the case and the determination of
the issues of fact therein to the court; and this is so even
though one of the parties requests submission of the issues of
fact to the jury. The doctrine is subject, however, to the
qualification that "the submission of special interrogatories
rests in the sound discretion of the trial court."
In a number of cases prior to Parker vs. Plympton, 85
Colo. 87, 273 P. 1030, the Supreme Court of Colorado held
that requests by both parties for a directed verdict constituted
a waiver of their right to go to a jury and were equivalent to
a stipulation that the facts might be found by the court.
However, the cited case was the first one to raise the question
of the application of the rule where one of the parties made
his motion subject to a reservation of right to have the issues
of fact submitted to the jury, in the event his motion should
be overruled.
The effect of motions for a directed verdict by both
parties was set forth in Parker vs. Plympton, supra, as fol-
lows:
"The motions of both parties were equivalent to a stipulation
that the evidence was undisputed, or at least that it was so clear and
convincing that reasonable men could draw only one inference from
it, so that it thereby became a matter of law for the court."
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The court rejected the contention that there was no
stipulation in the given case because of the reservation at-
tached to the motion, on the grounds that it does not permit
reservations to its rules without its consent, and said further:
"The rule is a privilege. It was optional with the parties to
invoke it, but having done so, they did it at their peril, plaintiff and
defendant alike, and they must take it as it stands, unless the parties
mutually agree to waive its effect, with the sanction of the court."
The court then cited as an instance of avoidance of the
rule by consent the case of McLagan vs. Granato, 80 Colo.
412, 252 P. 348, which held that where each side moved for
a directed verdict and the motions were denied and the case
then went to the jury without objection, neither party had
ground to complain.
In holding in the Plympton case that the defendant
Parker under the circumstances was not entitled to a submis-
sion of the issues of fact to the jury, the court nevertheless
adopted the decision of London Guarantee and Accident Co.
vs. Officer, 78 Colo. 441, 445, 242 P. 989, 991, that "the
submission of special interrogatories rests in the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court."
It was further held that it was not error to refuse de-
fendant Parker the right to withdraw his motion for an in-
structed verdict-leave to do so having been asked before a
ruling on the motion and because of the indicated proposal
of the trial judge to treat the case as one in which the jury
was waived. In this connection the court said:
"Whether or not permission to withdraw a motion may be said
to rest generally in the sound discretion of the court, it cannot be done
as a matter of right when it works an injury to the opposite party,
or disrupts procedure, or where it amounts to an imposition on the
court to grant it."
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